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6% of hospital patients experience a patient safety incident, of which 12% result in severe/fatal 
outcomes. Acutely sick patients are at heightened risk. Our aim was to identify the most frequently 
reported incidents in Acute Medical Units (AMU) and their characteristics.  
Design  
Retrospective mixed-methods methodology:(1) an a priori coding process, applying a multi-axial 
coding framework to incident reports; and, (2) a thematic interpretative analysis of reports. 
Setting 
Patient safety incident reports (10 years, 2005-2015) collected from the National Reporting and 
Learning System, which receives reports from hospitals and other care settings across England and 
Wales.  
Participants 
Reports describing severe harm/death in AMU were identified.  
Main outcome measures  
Incident type, contributory factors, outcomes and level of harm were identified in the included 
reports. During thematic analysis, themes and metathemes were synthesised to inform priorities for 
quality improvement.  
Results 
377 reports of severe harm or death were confirmed. The most common incident types were 
diagnostic errors (n=79), medication-related errors (n=61), and failures monitoring patients (n=57). 
Incidents commonly stemmed from lack of active decision-making during patient admissions and 
communication failures between teams. Patients were at heightened risk of unsafe care during 
handovers and transfers of care. Metathemes included the necessity of patient self-advocacy and a 
lack of care coordination. 
Conclusion 
This 10-year national analysis of incident reports provides recommendations to improve patient 
safety including: introduction of electronic prescribing and monitoring systems; forcing checklists to 









Patient safety incidents occur in 6% of patient cases acutely admitted to hospital, with 12% resulting 
in severe or fatal outcomes.1 In 2004, the Royal College of Physicians advocated Acute Medical Units 
(AMU) to relieve pressures on emergency departments,2 and improve patient outcomes.3 Ten years 
later a single Irish hospital study has reported decreased mortality since the introduction of an AMU 
(a 60% reduction in relative risk for individual patients).4 It is still the case that, despite major redesign 
of care delivery, little is known about  patient safety incidents occurring in AMU.  
Handovers and care transfers, diagnostic cognitive overload and staffing levels may be important 
factors.5 For example, a UK  team conducted a single site observational study (four one week periods 
over 18 months involving 36 staff and 71 patients) identifying delays in 44% of admissions.6 An 
observational and interview study from the same team demonstrated 46.2% (318/688) of medication 
charts contained errors, the majority of which involved omission of medication. This study highlighted 
variances in medication history-taking including a lack of collaborative histories before prescribing.7 
These data correlate with the findings of a 2008 narrative review of Australian medication incidents 
that described multifactorial underlying causes of errors with a paucity of evidence based solutions.8,9 
Another Australian study, examining routine reporting of handover related incidents in acute care, 
found omission of critical information in a third of incidents (153/459).10 
The existing evidence base for improvement in safety and quality in AMUs (aside from studies about 
the management of specific diseases) is also fragmented and neither extensive nor strong. A 
systematically conducted narrative review (published 2018) only identified nine studies in the UK or 
Ireland. These suggested potential benefit from increased pharmacy services, occupational therapy, 
and medical consultant input plus enhanced handovers.11 Further to this, identifiable evidence 
includes a multivariate analysis using survey data and adjusted case fatality rates (aCFR) in England 
which showed a statistically significant reductions in aCFR and re-admission rates when consultants 
were present for at least four hours per day.12 A smaller Italian study, also using routine data 
compared nursing staff levels with in-hospital mortality in 2017, drew similar conclusions: more 
experienced staff presence is safer for patients.13 More recently, interest in use of electronic systems 
to reduce errors has grown, including a Danish observational study showing a resulting reduction in 
medication administration errors.14 Further small studies suggest electronic handovers and the use of 
checklists are perceived as useful instruments by doctors.15,16 Evidence of clinical impact from these 
interventions is still required.  
Large data sets from incident reporting systems, such as the National Reporting and Learning System 
(NRLS) in England and Wales, can enable learning from patient safety incidents through identification 
of underlying causes and contributing factors. Contributory factors can be both active errors, such as 
staff mistakes, and latent conditions in the working environment or system, for example staff 
shortages. Analysis can provide an evidence base for targeting interventions at ‘real life’ challenges to 
prevent recurrence. 
Aims 
To understand the most frequent patient safety incidents resulting in severe harm or death, and their 
characteristics, from AMUs in England and Wales 
Objectives: 
1. Describe the characteristics of incidents, including type, contributory factors and harm 
outcomes. 
2. Interpret contributory factors in relation to incident types. 
3. Identify incident themes and metathemes to inform priorities for improvement. 
Methods 
 
National Reporting and Learning System 
NRLS receives incident reports from staff in NHS organisations across England and Wales. Each report 
has a structured section (incident type, harm severity, location, speciality and medication involved), 
and an unstructured free-text section (detailing what happened and any preceding events).17 
Sample formation 
All incidents reported from the AMU (including related synonyms) 05 April 2005-21 December 2015.  
All NRLS reports with the (IN03) category “location Accident (A)/Minor Injury Unit/Medical 
Assessment Unit” were extracted (n=168,090), subsequent exclusions are given in Figure 1. 
Initial data cleaning (see Figure 1) of 150,791 reports identified that 1,647 had severe harm or death 
outcomes. These were read in full by one researcher to confirm eligibility against pre-set 
inclusion/exclusion criteria complied by the research team. A second researcher reviewed reports 
flagged as problematic to match to the pre-set criteria and 177 randomly selected reports for 
inclusion/exclusion. Borderline reports (n=28)  were included/excluded if both researchers  reached 
consensus after discussion or after discussing with a third member of the research team. During this 
process reports were classified with a primary incident code (i.e., code used to describe the incident 
which occurred directly prior to the patient experiencing a harmful outcome or the code to exclude a 
report). 
[insert figure 1] 
Figure 1: Flow chart showing the number of reports and how the data sample was selected 
Methodology 
The study was informed by a constructionist approach accepting that our understanding of incidents 
is contingent on the human practices and interactions occurring within the context that each incident 
occurred and our own judgements as clinical researchers. We first conducted a descriptive analysis 
using an a priori coding framework drawn from the multi-axial classification system developed by the 
Patient Safety (PISA) group at Cardiff University (itself informed by nine rules from the recursive model 
of incident analysis developed by the Australian Patient Safety Foundation).17 Following this we 
conducted an interpretative thematic analysis.18 The use of a pre-existing framework alongside 
interpretative analysis provided us with checks and balances between theory and empirical data and 
between members of the research team.19 
A priori coding and descriptive analysis 
Each incident report was configured into a sequence of events resulting in the outcome (including 
severity) and identifying contributory incidents and factors. Codes from the PISA framework were 
applied to represent the incident type, contributory factors, outcome and harm severity. The PISA 
framework codes the severity based on the WHO International Classification for Patient Safety 
definitions for severe harm or death (Table 1). The classification with primary incident codes by one 
researcher was independently duplicated by a second research on a random sample (n=149). 
Following this a Cohen's kappa for interrater reliability was calculated for the primary incident coding 
to be 0.73 (p<0.05). All discrepancies were discussed with a third person arbitrator (ACS).   
The results of applying the PISA classification codes were used as quantitative categorical variables to 
explore inter-code relationships. Frequency charts, line graphs and cross tabulations were created 
(using Microsoft Excel version 2016, Microsoft Corporation). These were used to examine associations 
between codes, including relationships between the most common contributory factors, incident 
types, outcomes and harm severity, for example the incident type medication errors and contributory 
factor staff mistakes. The inter-code relationships between type and outcome are shown in Table 1. 
Contributory factors by incident type are shown in Table 2. Purposive sampling of reports supporting 
emerging hypotheses, including the most common or harmful relationships between incidents and 
contributory factors or outcomes, from the quantitative analysis were then analysed using thematic 
analysis. 
Interpretative thematic analysis 
Taking an in vivo approach to the same dataset, the free text data was analysed using qualitative 
interpretative codes, themes and metathemes were sought to understand the context, sequence of 
events and human interactions leading to incidents. ‘Metathemes’ is a term describing themes that 
are overarching and cross-cutting (i.e. intersecting with each other) in the data. A member of the 
research team (who had not conducted the a priori coding) reviewed the data for tentative 
interpretative codes independently to the rest of the team. Reports were then collectively re-read and 
group analysis by the whole team undertaken to identify our final interpretative codes. These were 
collated into themes. Themes and codes were then mapped onto a theoretical process map (Figure 2) 
of the movement of a patient through the AMU, from which the metathemes were developed. 
Synthesis of mixed methods analysis  
The multiple analytic techniques were synthesised collectively to interpret findings, from both 
descriptive and interpretative analyses, and identify priority areas for interventions to reduce 
healthcare associated harm. These were then mapped onto a driver diagram, linked to pre-existing 
evidence for interventions to target these areas. Together Figures 2 and 3 provide a summary of the 
theory of change generated through this study.  
Results 
377 confirmed reports of severe harm or death were included in our final analyses following 
application of the PISA framework to identify the primary incident code (see Figure 1 for final 
inclusion and exclusion criteria). Due to the anonymization of data it was not possible to be certain 
how many unique patients this equated to. The most common incidents were: diagnostic error 
(n=79), medication error (n=61) and monitoring errors (n=57) (Table 1). 216 reports (57%) contained 
one or more identifiable contributory factors: most commonly failure to follow protocols (n=30) and 
staff mistakes (n=23). 
Table 1: The primary incident types from the included reports and the harm outcomes from the a priori 
coding using the PISA classification. 






Treatment or procedure 23 43 41 107 
Insufficient treatment/care/monitoring 13 28 16 57 
Treatment not given in a timely fashion 4 7 9 20 
Error in conducting procedure 3 1 3 7 
Complication  1 5 6 
No treatment/care give 2 4 6 12 
Other 1 2 2 5 
Diagnosis and Assessment 32 35 38 105 
Diagnostic error 30 25 24 79 
Insufficient assessment of patient  2 4 7 13 
Errors in discharge, including premature discharge  3 3 6 
Delayed assessment  3 4 7 
Medication 19 14 28 61 
Clinical treatment decision 6 5 10 21 
Prescribing  6 3 2 11 
Drug omission  1 7 8 
Administration 1 1 5 7 
Timeliness of medication  3 2 2 7 
Other (dispensing, adverse events, overdose) 3 2 2 7 
Referral 9 10 25 44 
Staff errors during referral of a patient 4 7 14 25 
Errors in transfer (wrong location or transfer delayed) 4 3 10 17 
Other 1  1 2 
Investigation 4 9 13 26 
Laboratory tests and results 3 6 3 12 
Imaging investigations 1 2 10 13 
Other investigations  1  1 
Equipment 1 2 15 18 
Failure of equipment   6 6 
Insufficient supply of equipment  1 6 7 
Other 1 1 3 5 
Administration 1  5 6 
Communication 2 2 3 7 
Other  1 2 3 
The harm severity of reports was coded according to the harm severity levels from the WHO International Classification for Patient safety:20 
• No harm: Patient has no symptoms and no further treatment is necessary 
• Low harm: Mild symptoms experienced that are short term. None or little treatment is necessary. 
• Moderate harm: Patient experiences symptoms, further interventions or a longer admission are needed, and the resulting harm 
or loss of function is either permanent or long standing  
• Severe harm: Major or life-saving treatment/intervention is required which leads to a reduced life expectancy or permanent or 
long-term serious loss of function or harm 
• Death: The incident caused the death of the patient 
 
Using the PISA framework, 116 reports described a patient death, 91 described other severe harm. 
The PISA harm level was unclear for 170 reports, because no outcome was described by the reporter 
or the report had insufficient detail to reach an unequivocal conclusion. Such reports were included 
when the research team, judged drawing on their own clinical expertise that severe harm or death 
was likely given the raw data that was provided. Using the PISA framework, of the reports with an 
NRLS code of severe harm 189 reports (72%) were reclassified according to the WHO harm severities 
and 55 of the death reports (38%) were reclassified (see Table 1). Of the included reports (n=377), 
outcomes were explicit in 259 reports (69%), the most common outcome was death (n=116, 31%), 
followed by delays in management (n=37, 10%). 
Table 2: Contributory Factors by Incident Type (see Appendix for a more detailed breakdown) 
 
Incident Type  
Contributory Factors 
Patient Factors Staff Factors Equipment/medication 
Transfer of 
care/handovers 
Referrals and transfers of 
patients  2 6 1 23 
Diagnostic error 8 19 0 15 
Errors in assessment  1 2 0 9 
Treatment errors 5 20 5 39 
Medication errors 5 17 1 10 
Investigation/imaging 
errors 1 4 0 8 
Communication errors 1 1 0 3 
Equipment incidents 1 1 4 1 
Administration Errors 0 0 0 3 
 
Patient trajectory  
A common theme with patient trajectory was lack of active decision-making and communication 
between teams, see Figure 2. Errors occurred due to a lack of clarity regarding responsibilities for 
patient care co-ordination, especially during emergency situations or out-of-hours. Poor 
documentation of long-term management plans and no reliable review system to ensure follow-up 
by the most appropriate teams contributed. 
Patient monitoring errors (n=57) occurred throughout AMU from arrival to discharge. Over half of 
reports involving errors in monitoring resulted in death of patients (n=30). One third of these incidents 
occurred overnight (n=11), see example 10 (Table 3). Lack of continuity of care between different 
locations in the hospital was described in 36 reports, commonly overnight (n=24), see example 8 
(Table 3). Errors in continuity of care included lack of necessary treatment, failure to follow 
management plans, results not acted on appropriately, and observations not done or acted upon 
when informing early warning scores, see example 10. Communication errors occurred during 
handovers between teams or transfer of patients between locations in the hospital (n=9). These 
resulted in patients not receiving the necessary treatment (n=12), see example 11, specialist care they 
require (n=5) or senior review (n=3), see example 9.  
Arrival in AMU to diagnosis  
Common errors that occurred immediately after patients arrived in AMU included problems 
identifying significant illnesses early, especially if presentations were atypical. Errors involved 
“routine” investigations that are commonly requested for all patients, the results of which were 
often not acted upon or false reassurance was gained from negative results when the most 
appropriate investigation may not have been requested. Diagnostic error was the most common 
incident type occurring in the reports (n=79). Delayed diagnosis was the most common (n=36) 
diagnostic error, and cancer was the most commonly missed diagnosis (n=11). Diagnostic errors 
resulted in death (n=24) and delays in management (n=20). Staff mistakes were frequently identified 
as having led up to diagnostic errors (n=15), these were most often mistakes interpreting 
investigations, including ECGs and imaging tests (n=9), see example 1 and 2 (Table 3). The most 
common diagnosis associated with delays in management was myocardial infarction (n=4), often 
due to misinterpretation of ECGs, see example 1 and 3. 
Our analysis shows the system relies on the most junior doctors and staff members seeing patients 
first. A lack of experience led to problems recognising acutely unwell patients, selecting appropriate 
proformas to use or accessing senior help.  
Management and commencement of care 
Between diagnosis and initiation of a management plan errors occurred due to reliance on earlier 
professionals’ interpretation of investigations or patient histories and examinations. Errors were 
perpetuated through this mechanism. Patients were at a higher risk of patient safety incidents when 
there were multiple handovers between teams; transfers between wards; and the out-of-hours 
settings including during the night, see Figure 2. 
Medication errors were the second most common incident occurring, representing 16% (n=61) of 
severe harm and death reports. The commonest contributory factors were failure to follow protocol 
(n=8) and staff mistakes (n=6). Staff mistakes arose from failures in continuity of care provided to 
patients. This discontinuity of care included errors responding to test results (n=4), such as failure to 
act on a raised INR, and prescribed medications being omitted (n=4), or deteriorating vital signs, see 
example 4, 5 and 7 (Table 3). Within the medication error reports, the main theme was human error, 
including errors with handwriting or allergies not being checked or documented appropriately. 
Human errors such as these could be mitigated by system changes such as electronic prescribing. 
One fifth of the medication errors resulted in patient death (n=13); these commonly occurred 
overnight (n=6). The most common medication type associated with death following a medication 
error was antibiotics (n=5), see example 6.  
Transfer  
Errors commonly occurred when the care of patients was being transferred from AMU to the 
community or another speciality. Errors in continuity of medication, care plans and follow-up for 
patients after discharge were common themes. Patient care was often delayed due to a lack of 
available beds, delaying access to specialist care.  
Metathemes  
The strongest metatheme throughout reports was: 
• the system largely depending on patient advocacy, and patients who were unable to self-
advocate were often overlooked due to system pressures. Self-advocacy was necessary due 
to a lack of care co-ordination during the patient journey, resulting in patients having to 
remind staff about investigations or referrals.  
Further metathemes were:  
• lack of care coordination, (which was prominent in reports involving patients with terminal 
illness or who were very frail), when there was a lack of appreciation for the final aim of 
treatment, where interventions were leading, or the reversibility of conditions. This was 
often due to only the subsequent step of the management plan being communicated, rather 
than the overall aims of management. 
• Decision-making using incomplete information leading to errors, which, similarly to a lack of 
care coordination, meant that the decisions made were not always the most appropriate for 
the patient, see Figure 2.  
 
Table 3: A table showing examples of the Acute Medical Unit severe harm and death reports from 
the NRLS. Exemplar quotes have been pseudoanonymised and spelling corrected for clarification 
purposes. In some cases this required removal of data elements (e.g. a rare condition). Edits are 
indicated in square brackets with […] indicating the need to remove identifiable data. 
Example 1 
Missed diagnosis of MI - ECG had ST elevation, delay to thrombolysis. 
Example 2 
MEAU. Patient admitted with a headache of sudden onset. CT was reported as normal when subtle 
blood was visible. [Lumbar puncture] not done by medical team. Patient discharged but readmitted 
with massive subarachnoid haemorrhage and died. 
Example 3 
GP referral with central chest pain, radiating to left arm, troponin test was elevated, seen by on 
call physician and sent home, continued to have chest pain readmitted to CCU with substantial 
further rise in troponin and widespread ECG changes 
Example 4 
Patient was prescribed ACS treatment as ?NSTEMI positive trop T. The aspirin 300mg, clopidogrel 
300mg and fondaparinux 2.5mg were not signed for on Cerner or on any paper chart which points 
to a missed dose. 
Example 5 
Admitted generally unwell. Referred in with a raised INR (8.8), repeat INR 8.3. Delay in recognition 
of elevated INR (missed in clerking and post take ward round). Identified on evening [night round]. 
Vit K prescribed but not given. 
Example 6 
Patient prescribed IV Augmentin. First dose given at 03:10 approx. Patient later arrested and died. 
As patient appeared to be fitting I checked the drug chart for Diazemuls to realise she was penicillin 
allergic. An arrest call was put out and doctors informed of allergy. Patient immediately given IV 
[adrenaline] and Hydrocortisone 200 mg IV. CPR was not successful, and patient died. 
Example 7 
Patient referred by GP with a diagnosis of acute renal failure and urinary sepsis, arrived at hospital 
16:30, initial bloods showed [creatinine] 812 and [potassium] 7.8, [arterial blood gas] showed 
lactate 8.1. Unclear to what extent this was recognised and treated over the 9 hours from 
admission- the drug chart did not show any treatments running- patient remained anuric and 
became increasingly hypotensive then had a cardiac arrest at 01:30. Transiently resuscitated with 
adrenaline but then re-arrested and died. 
Example 8 
[Patient] presented 16:30 with urosepsis (septic shock). Treated with fluids and IV antibiotics, but 
failed to maintain parameters (HR, BPP, HR, SATS). No further entry in the notes after clerking. No 
handover to night SpR. Nurse on shift no handover from colleague for further medical involvement. 
Called to see patient peri-arrest. Failed to resuscitate after 1 hour and 1 return of circulation 
midway. Stopped due to multiorgan failure, aspiration, futility and failure to re-establish output. 
Example 9 
Patient admitted on [date] with sepsis. She was referred to outreach due to deteriorating 
observations. It was found later that the patient had MRSA but she could not be transferred to side 
room for barrier nursing due to needing high dependency care. She later needed to be transferred 
to ITU but no beds available and the [patient’s] condition continued to deteriorate. She died [three 
days later] with neither transfer to ITU taking place and or a decision being made to withdraw care. 
There were no hourly observations carried out prior to death. 
Example 10 
Patient admitted on [date 1] at 13:00 to A&E with fall. Cardiac [observations] recorded at 13:10, 
[track and trigger] score of 2 next set in A&E at 16:05 [track and trigger] score of 2. [Patient] 
transferred to CDU; seen by medical team at 18:30 no observations recorded on admission to 
CDU. [Patient] suffered cardiac arrest at 06:48am on the [next day]. No observations recorded 
from 16:05 on [date 1] until post arrest the [next morning]. Patient [died] (on end of life care) on 
[3 days later]. 
Example 11 
[Patient] transferred from A&E at 15:45 hours, staff nurse from A&E given handover about [patient] 
to [specialist nurse]. The [specialist nurse] was told that [patient] had been admitted with right 
sided weakness and headache, nurse was not informed that [patient] had chest pain or that an ECG 
taken whilst [patient] in A&E indicated that [patient] experienced anterior myocardial infarction. 




[Insert figure 2] 
Figure 2: Process map of the complexities, and interacting elements of a patient journey through the AMU, showing the 
qualitative codes in blue, the themes in green and the overarching metathemes in red. Themes and metathemes are 
shown to overlap as ‘Metathemes’ is a term describing themes that are overarching and cross-cutting (i.e. intersecting with 
each other) in the data. For example, ‘Lack of active decision making and communication between teams’ is a specific 
theme which interacts with (i.e. both results from and exacerbates) ‘Lack of care coordination between health 
professionals and different teams, lack of knowledge of who is in charge’, while the latter is also resulting from and 
exacerbated by other themes such as patient monitoring = not done or acted on, and indeed codes such as reliance on the 
most junior members of staff attending to patients first. 
Driver diagram 
Priority areas and existing evidence (from scoping pre-existing published literature) for targeted 
interventions, that could be implanted in AMUs or on a wider system level, were mapped onto a 
driver diagram (Figure 3). 
 
[Insert figure 3] 
Figure 3 Driver diagram showing the key areas causing iatrogenic harm to patients in the AMU and potential 




This is the first analysis of all the severe harm and death incident reports occurring in the AMU 
across England and Wales. The depth of qualitative analysis is novel for work of this nature as is the 
identification of overarching and cross-cutting metathemes which intersect across a given patient’s 
journey through the AMU. Our work adds value methodologically as well as pinpointing to 
practitioners where and how they could improve their own systems through quality improvement. 
Our study confirms that diagnostic error was very prevalent. Lack of attention paid by healthcare staff 
or patients to co-incidental signs and symptoms, can prevent differential diagnoses being 
considered.21 Diagnostic error was often due to misinterpretation of “routine” investigations and 
results were not acted upon or tests were requested without a clear understanding of what results 
would add to care..  
Medication error is a large-scale problem across healthcare, not just within the AMU. In 2015, 
medication error accounted for just over 10% of the total NRLS reports in England.22 This study 
identified that discontinuity of care between different healthcare providers commonly led to 
medication errors, due to management plans not being implemented following communication 
failures.8 Many medication error reports in the AMU occurred overnight and mentioned the inability 
to reach the out-of-hours pharmacist. The Royal Pharmaceutical Society and NHS England support the 
need for  7-day pharmacy services in acute hospitals to improve care.23 
Higher patient-doctor ratios and decreased senior presence could explain increased risk of incidents 
overnight.2 In this study, patients’ vital signs and early warning scores (EWS) were often not handed 
over. The National Patient Safety Agency recognised this concern in “Safer Care for Acutely Ill 
Patients”, as failures to recognise or act on patient deterioration were a major cause of deaths.25  
Strengths and weaknesses 
The NRLS reports in this study came from the front-line healthcare professionals over a 10-year period 
and provide deeper insight to the most frequently occurring and severe incidents. However, it is likely 
underreporting of incidents occurs in the AMU as elsewhere. While we have taken great care to 
produce a representative sample it remains possible that some elements may be under or over-
represented  as the database is dependent on what people choose to report. Reporting bias may 
influence reporting of near misses or incidents with lesser consequences disproportionately as it is 
harder to overlook reporting of severe consequences. 75% of the most severe AMU incidents had to 
be excluded from the full mixed method analysis, often because of insufficient detail, which could 
represent the loss of vital learning opportunities. However, this analysis provides the first insight into 
what is reported as narrative. To reduce confirmation bias, double-coding was used with a high degree 
of inter-rater reliability (0.73) of bilaterally included and excluded reports, and collective approaches 
to analysis were used to increase reflexivity. Despite the limitations outlined, In comparison to 
previous studies in AMU, using NRLS data over a 10-year period, this study provides not just 
understanding of the categories of incidents leading to severe harm and death but also a 
methodologically robust interpretation of where gaps in reporting may lie, and the links between 
contributing factors (including human factors issues) and the existing evidence base for interventions 
which can be targeted at the priority themes and metathemes found. Specific interventions that might 
help are shown in Figure 3. 
Meaning of the study 
Diagnostic errors are frequently caused by errors in the cognitive processes underpinning diagnosis.25 
These errors can be prevented by using checklists which provide a layout for assessing patients, this 
can alert clinicians to any areas where more information needs to be collected.16 In the process map 
(Figure 2), diagnostic errors were common and often due to inexperience of staff so checklists could 
help ensure important diagnoses are not missed. 
Medication errors can be reduced by the presence of an additional medical admission pharmacist 
seven days a week, as this can improve the number of full medication histories taken on admission.26 
Many of the medication errors occurring in the AMU, could be reduced with wider implementation of 
Electronic Prescribing Systems (EPS). However, in 2013 only 13% of acute NHS hospitals surveyed had 
a hospital-wide EPS.27 As well as EPS, an integrated electronic health record would allow the 
prescription chart, patient monitoring and notes to be stored in one place to improve the continuity 
of care and monitoring of patients, as well as reducing medication errors.28 
Errors related to patient monitoring can be due to “alarm fatigue”, where the high volume of alarms 
causes staff to become unresponsive. Intelligent integrated monitoring systems combine patient 
parameters to trigger a single alarm for an acutely deteriorating patient, based on their baseline 
parameters. These alarms are more patient specific, reduce the risk of redundant alarms causing 
“alarm fatigue”.29 Intelligent monitoring systems also remove the human error in calculating EWS and 
omitted observations, by allowing electronic recording of patients' observations, a recommendation 
from the Francis Report.28, 29 Since the introduction of the European working time directive, an 
increased number of handovers occur in hospitals. Electronic handover systems allow doctors to 
provide up to date patient information, including monitoring, and create lists of outstanding tasks, 
improving the safety of handovers.15 Errors during handover were a common cause of errors in patient 
monitoring and many of these errors occurred overnight. One study showed that having a consultant 
on the AMU at all times decreased the fatality rate of patients.12  
Future research 
Future research in this area should focus on the themes and metathemes in our priority areas to 
improve the safety of patients in the AMU. This study focussed on the most severe and harmful 
reports, future learning from low, moderate and no harm incidents could provide vital learning 
about common and near miss incidents which account for 99% of the AMU NRLS reports.  
Conclusion 
Underlying Incidents within the AMU were decision-making based on incomplete information, lack of 
care coordination and the necessity of self-advocacy from patients as a safety net. The learning from 
these reports represent an invaluable opportunity to improve the safety of the AMU for future 
patients.  
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